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1 Introduction
In the early 1970s, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) put forward the idea that nan-
cial repression i.e. government imposed controls on lending and deposit rates, capital
controls, and directed credit - had a negative impact on investment and growth by sup-
pressing domestic saving and distorting the allocation of credit. While their views were
vigorously challenged by a range of critics,1 their main policy recommendation for -
nancial liberalisation gained momentum among policy makers in both developing and
developed countries. As a result, the last forty years have witnessed a gradual removal
of nancial restraints worldwide with increased movement of capital around the globe.2
Both these developments are likely to inuence the behaviour of private investment.
Increased international capital ows are likely to result in a relaxation of borrowing
constraints for many rms, leading to credit expansion.3 Under fully liberalised con-
ditions the price of credit for many, if not all, rms will rise, making their investment
plans more sensitive to the price of credit and no longer sensitive to the availability
of credit. Under partial liberalisation or continued nancial repression, however, some
rms may continue to have access to subsidised credit while others may have access
to more expensive international loans. Does the retention of nancial restraints under
these circumstances deter or promote investment? In other words, once a country
moves away from complete nancial repression - where the only source of credit for
private investment is the domestic banking system - can the provision of cheaper,
albeit rationed, domestic credit help stimulate private investment? This is the ques-
tion we address in this paper. In order to do so, we employ a theoretical model of
investment which assumes that rms have access to quantity-constrained domestic
loans that are cheaper than those they can obtain from international capital mar-
kets.4 This accommodates the idea that increased international capital ows might
1See for example, Arestis and Demetriades (1999 ), Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Hellman et al. (2000),
Singh (1997), Stiglitz (1994), Taylor (1983), Van Wijnbergen (1983).
2Abiad and Mody (2005) document the gradual reduction of nancial restraints around the world
while Lane and Milessi-Ferretti (2005) document the increase in nancial openness.
3In some circumstances, such credit expansion can also feed consumption and lead to asset price
bubbles (see, for example, Gylfason et al. 2010).
4The model is based on Demetriades and Devereux (2000).
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have relaxed borrowing constraints for many rms while, at the same time, some rms
may have continued to benet from access to cheaper policy loans. We operationalise
the model in a multi-country setting and derive ve variants of a private investment
equation including a baseline neoclassical model without nancial restraints. To es-
timate the investment equations, we employ recently developed nonstationary panel
methodologies that allow for cross-sectional dependence across countries. The pres-
ence of dependence across countries is a plausible hypothesis in a world characterised
by growing real and nancial inter-linkages, which we test by appropriate econometric
procedures.
Our sample includes 20 developing countries over the period 1972-2000. The econo-
metric analysis consists of three steps. First, unit root tests for cross-sectionally depen-
dent panels are applied. Second, the existence of a cointegrating relationship among
the variables is investigated, fully allowing for cross-section dependence. Third, the
Fully Modied Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) estimator developed by Bai and Kao
(2006) is used to estimate the investment equations. We contrast our results with
those obtained using the pooled FMOLS estimator of Pedroni (2000) which assumes
cross-sectional independence.
Our ndings conrm the importance of taking into account cross-country depen-
dence. We nd that when we allow for cross-sectional dependence, investment displays
more sensitivity to world capital market conditions and exchange rate uncertainty.
Perhaps more surprisingly, we nd that repressingdomestic real interest rates re-
sulted in higher levels of private investment than those that would have been obtained
under more liberalised conditions. This nding, which contrasts sharply with the
McKinnon-Shaw prediction, complements a growing literature on the possible neg-
ative e¤ects of nancial liberalisation on the channels of economic growth. Stiglitz
(1994) provides a unifying theoretical rationale for such e¤ects, drawing on informa-
tion asymmetries in nancial markets which provide scope for meaningful government
interventions. Singh (1997), drawing on Keynes (1936) and a large body of empirical
evidence, emphasises the negative e¤ects that emanate from stock market volatility.
Demetriades and Luintel (2001) provide evidence of positive e¤ects of nancial re-
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straints on South Koreas nancial development, reecting lack of competition in the
banking system. More recently, Andrianova et al. (2008 and 2010) provide evidence
suggesting that bank privatisation - one of the main pillars of nancial liberalisation 
has been negatively associated with both nancial development and growth, reecting
poor regulation. Last but not least, recent work by Ang (2010) suggests that nan-
cial liberalisation had a negative e¤ect on technological deepening by distorting the
allocation of human capital.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the modelling framework.
Section 3 discusses econometric methodology and empirical results. Section 4 sum-
marises and concludes.
2 The modelling framework
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings
The dynamic investment equations estimated in this paper are based on the theoretical
model put forward by Demetriades and Devereux (2000), henceforth D&D. D&D use
a microeconomic model of a representative rms investment decision under nancial
restraints as their starting point. The model suggests a structural relationship between
the optimal capital stock and the modiedcost of capital which is then used to derive
a long-run theory-consistent aggregate investment equation that takes into account the
presence of nancial restraints. The rest of this section provides a brief outline of the
D&D approach.
The main assumption of D&D is that the o¢ cial banking system is unable to satisfy
the entire demand for investible funds because of the presence of an interest rate ceiling
which restricts the supply of funds à la McKinnon-Shaw (see also Fry, 1994). The
model departs from the McKinnonShaw tradition, however, in that it assumes the
existence of an alternativenancial market in which rms can borrow freely, albeit
at an interest rate that is higher than the o¢ cial lending rate. Their interpretation of
the alternative market is that it is the world capital market although it could also be
interpreted as the uno¢ cial credit market, or curb, market (see Taylor, 1983 and Van
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Wijnebergen, 1983). There are theoretical and empirical reasons for us preferring the
rst interpretation to the second, not least the stylised facts relating to the increased
international capital ows alluded to in the introduction. Thus, we assume that rms
have access to two types of borrowing: domestic bank borrowing and international
loans. Rationing of domestic loans to di¤erent rms is assumed to depend on the
availability of collateral which is related to the rms capital stock.
The representative rm is assumed to maximize the wealth of its shareholders given
by the present discounted value of dividends (Dt). The nominal discount rate used in
determining the present value is the one which is obtained in the world capital market,
denoted it , since this is the rate at which shareholders are assumed to be able to borrow
or lend as much as they wish.5 Note that the rm takes both the domestic lending rate
it and the world interest rate it as determined exogenously in the appropriate market.
Moreover, the rm is assumed to be able to raise nance only through borrowing or
retained earnings.
Formally, the optimisation problem can be stated as:
Max
It
Et
( 1X
s=t+1
sDs
)
; (1)
where s =
sQ
l=t+1
(1 + il 1)
 1; subject to the following constraints:
Dt = qtYt   ptIt +Bt   (1 + it)Bt 1 + At   (1 + it )At 1; (2)
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It; (3)
Bt  xtptKt; (4)
where Etf:g is the expectations operator, qtYt represents current revenue, where qt is
the price of output in period t and Yt is output, and where the latter is a function of
5The model assumes that there are two groups of investors in the country: sophisticated investors,
who can lend and borrow in the world capital market and who own shares, and unsophisticated
investors, who save only in the o¢ cial banking sector.
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the capital stock at the beginning of the period, Yt = f(Kt 1).6 The value of current
investment is represented by ptIt, where pt is the current price of capital goods and
It is the quantity of investment made during period t. New issues of one period debt
from the domestic and international market are denoted Bt   Bt 1 and At   At 1
respectively, while itBt 1 and itAt 1 are nominal interest payments to the domestic
and international capital market, respectively.7 The exponential rate of depreciation
of capital is assumed constant at .
The rst two constraints are standard in models of rm investment. The rst
constraint is the ow of funds identity for the rm and the second constraint is the
equation of motion of the capital stock. The third constraint is specic to D&D; it
constrains the supply of domestic bank loans in the domestic market to be a proportion,
xt, of the value of the rms capital stock. The capital stock, therefore, represents
collateral; banks are willing to lend more to large rms than to small rms.8
Taking rst-order conditions together yields
Et[qt+1f
0(Kt)] = itpt + Etpt+1   (Etpt+1   pt) 
pt(i

t   it)
(1 + it )
xt: (5)
This states that, in equilibrium, the expected marginal revenue product of capital
is equal to a modied cost of capital. The modied cost of capital consists of: the
nancial cost at the rate in the international market itpt; plus the cost of the fall in the
value of the asset Etpt+1; minus the expected capital gain term, Etpt+1  pt; plus the
nal term which reects the reduction in the standard cost of capital relative to the
international capital market. This nal term shows the cheaper source of nance which
is available at rate it but acknowledges that only a proportion xjt can be nanced in
this way.
Equation (5) holds for every rm in the economy in the steady-state. D&D show
that the same relationship will be observed in the economy as a whole providing that
6Stocks dated t refer to the end of period t, equivalent to the beginning of period t+ 1.
7In both markets, the model assumes that the nominal interest rate is set at the time the borrowing
takes place. Thus, for example, the interest rate applying to o¢ cial borrowing at the beginning of
period t (the end of period t   1, denoted Bt 1) is determined at the beginning of the period and
hence denoted it 1.
8Note that rms cannot borrow from the domestic market to lend on the international market.
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certain aggregation conditions are satised and that rm-specic shocks to the propor-
tion of a rms capital stock nanced out of bank loans cancel out across rms. The
steady-state relationship can be embedded in a dynamic model that explains aggregate
behaviour by assuming that investment is driven by the di¤erence between the actual
marginal product of capital and its equilibrium level based on (5). Additional dynam-
ics would be generated by time lags in decision-making, ordering, delivery, installation
of new capital, and so on. The dynamic investment equation corresponding to (5) is
then given by
Ijt
Kt 1
= b0 + b1
It 1
Kt 2
+ b2
Yt
Kt 1
+ bj3

1 + it
1 + et
  1

+ b4
(it   it)
(1 + it )(1 + et )
Bt
Kt 1
: (6)
where the subscript j refers to rm j. The term Yt=Kt 1 is interpreted as a proxy
for the marginal product of capital and the modied cost of capital is split into two
components: the real interest rate in the world capital market and the term capturing
nancial restraints.
Since we expect investment to depend on the di¤erence between the marginal prod-
uct and the modied cost of capital, the theoretical model predicts that b2 should be
positive and b3 negative. The fourth term is present only under nancial restraints. A
positive b4 would provide support for the hypothesis that the existence of an alternative
market for credit outweighs the credit rationing e¤ect described by McKinnonShaw.
In such a case, increasing the level of the interest rate ceiling in the domestic market
would serve to increase the overall cost of capital (which corresponds to Figure 1 in
D&D). On the other hand, a negative b4 would suggest that the existence of the al-
ternative market is not su¢ cient to outweigh the McKinnon-Shaw e¤ect, i.e. higher
domestic interest will have a positive e¤ect on investment on balance. In this case,
the supply of domestic nancial savings is elastic with respect to the domestic interest
rate so that an increase in the domestic interest rate has a relatively large e¤ect on
the domestic supply of investable funds (this corresponds to Figure 2 in D&D).
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2.2 Operationalising the model in a multi-country analysis
There are three variables in equation (6) that are not directly observed and require
modelling assumptions to be made to operationalise the model in a multi-country
empirical analysis, the capital stock, the world capital market interest rate and the
nancial restraints dummy. The construction of the rst is based on the perpetual
inventory method given by expression (3).9 The interest rate i used here is the US
lending rate. Given the sample of countries we are using, we believe that the US rate
is the most appropriate rate to approximate the cost of loans from the world market.
The expected ination series are in turn proxied by the current ination rate prevailing
in each country. The nancial restraints dummy is based on nominal interest rate
di¤erential i  i. In the theoretical model, the supply of bank loans becomes rationed
only if i exceeds i. This suggests that an observation could be considered as being
under conditions of nancial restraintsif i   i > 0. Five variants of Equation (6)
are estimated to allow some exibility in the way that nancial restraints are dened
and to capture the possible e¤ects of exchange rate risk.10
The rst model is a "Neo-Classical" investment equation denoted NCwhich
corresponds to a world without nancial restraints (bj4 = 0):
Ijt
Kjt 1
= bj0 + bj1
Ijt 1
Kjt 2
+ bj2
Yjt
Kjt 1
+ bj3r

t + "jt; (7a)
where the subscript j refers to country j and the error term is IID(0; 2j) across time
but may be correlated across countries as a result of common real or nancial shocks.
The second model denoted FRAtests the nancial restraints hypothesis assum-
ing that all the countries always operate under conditions of nancial restraints:
Ijt
Kjt 1
= bj0 + bj1
Ijt 1
Kjt 2
+ bj2
Yjt
Kjt 1
+ bj3r

t + bj4
(it   it)
(1 + it )(1 + t)
Bjt
Kjt 1
+ "jt: (7b)
9The initial capital stock for each country was constructed by using K0 = ((
1974P
t=1970
It)=5)=, where
 is the depreciation rate, assumed to be 4%.
10Although for tractability reasons, exchange rate risk is not explicitly taken into account in the
underlying theoretical model, in reality this may deter domestic rms from borrowing in international
markets.
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The third model denoted FRDalso accommodates the possible e¤ect of nancial
restraint but the nancial restraints term is now interacted withDjt, a dummy variable
that equals 1 when an observation is considered as being under condition of nancial
restraints (as dened above) and 0 otherwise:
Ijt
Kjt 1
= bj0 + bj1
Ijt 1
Kjt 2
+ bj2
Yjt
Kjt 1
+ bj3r

t +
~bj4Djt
(it   it)
(1 + it )(1 + t)
Bjt
Kjt 1
+ "jt: (7c)
The fourth model denoted FRA(unrestricted) "unbundles" the nancial restraints
term into its two components, the real interest rate di¤erential and the ination rate
di¤erential:
Ijt
Kjt 1
= bj0+bj1
Ijt 1
Kjt 2
+bj2
Yjt
Kjt 1
+bj3r

t+
bj4
(rt   rjt)
(1 + it )(1 + t)
Bjt
Kjt 1
+bj5
(t   jt)
(1 + it )(1 + t)
Bjt
Kjt 1
+"jt:
(7d)
The fth model denoted FR-ERintroduces a measure of exchange rate uncer-
tainty to capture the risk associated with international borrowing by domestic rms,
which may have a negative e¤ect on investment:
Ijt
Kjt 1
= bj0 + bj1
Ijt 1
Kjt 2
+ bj2
Yjt
Kjt 1
+ bj3r

t + bj4
(it   it)
(1 + it )(1 + t)
Bjt
Kjt 1
(7e)
+~bj5SDEXjt
Bjt
Kjt 1
+ b6jtSDEXjt + "jt;
where SDEXjt is the 3-year moving average of the standard deviation of the domestic
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar.
3 Econometric methodology and empirical results
The empirical analysis consists of three steps. In the rst step, we test for non-
stationarity in the data using the testing procedures developed by Bai and Ng (2004),
labelled by them as PANIC. The basic idea consists of modelling the panel series as
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the sum of a set of common factors and idiosyncratic components. Both the factors
and the idiosyncratic components can be I(1) or stationary, so that dependence can
be modelled not only through the disturbance terms but also through the common
factors. Bai and Ng propose to test the factors and the idiosyncratic components
separately. This feature makes it possible to ascertain if nonstationarity comes from a
pervasive or an idiosyncratic source.11 In the second step, we investigate the existence
of a cointegrating relationship for all the models. To this end, the panel procedure
recently developed by Gengenbach et al. (2006) is applied.
1. A preliminary PANIC analysis on each variable Xi;t and Yi;t to extract common
factors is conducted. Tests for unit roots are performed on both the common factors
and the idiosyncratic components using the Bai and Ng (2004) procedure.
2. a. If I(1) common factors and I(0) idiosyncratic components are detected, then a
situation of cross-member cointegration is found and consequently the nonstationarity
in the panel is entirely due to a reduced number of common stochastic trends. Cointe-
gration between Yi;t and Xi;t can only occur if the common factors for Yi;t cointegrate
with those of Xi;t. The null of no cointegration between the estimated factors can be
tested using the Johansen (1988) trace test as suggested by Gengenbach et al. (2006).
2. b. If I(1) common factors and I(1) idiosyncratic components are detected, then
defactored series are used. In particular, Yi;t andXi;t are defactored separately. Testing
for no cointegration between the defactored data can be conducted using standard
panel tests for no cointegration such as those of Pedroni (1999) and Pedroni (2004).
Cointegration between Yi;t and Xi;t is found only when the tests for both the common
factors and the idiosyncratic components reject the null of no cointegration.12
In the third step, we estimate the long-relationship among the variables of inter-
est in the ve models under consideration using the continuous-update fully modied
(CUP-FM) estimator developed Bai and Kao (2006). These authors discuss the lim-
iting distributions of various panel OLS and FM estimators and argue for the use of
11Other testing procedures based on factor structure generally test the unit root only in the defac-
tored data. See for instance Moon and Perron (2004).
12The framework used by Gengenbach et al. (2006) leads to panel statistics for the null of no
cointegration that have the same distribution as panel unit root tests and hence are not a¤ected by
the number of regressors.
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CUP-FM estimators.13
Our panel dataset contains 20 countries over the period 1972-2000. The coun-
tries were chosen because of data availability. A detailed description of the countries
involved, measurement of variables and data sources is given in the Appendix. To
support the cross-sectional dependence hypothesis, the CD test developed by Pesaran
(2004) is applied to our data. The test proposed is:
CD =
s
2T
N(N   1)
N 1X
i=1
NX
j=i+1
^ij

; (8)
where
^ij = ^ji =
PT
t=1 eitejt
(
PT
t=1 e
2
it)
1=2(
PT
t=1 e
2
jt)
1=2
denote the sample estimate of the pair-wise correlation of the residuals eit from the
regression of any variable of interest on an intercept, a linear trend and a lagged
dependent variable for each country i. CD test results are reported in Table 1. Clear
evidence of cross-sectional dependence is found since the null hypothesis of no cross-
correlation is strongly rejected.
Table 2 reports the results of the Bai and Ng (2004), Pesaran (2207) and Moon
and Perron (2004) panel unit root tests. The CIPS test of Pesaran (2007) and the
ta and t

b tests of Moon and Perron (2004) are included in the analysis because they
have greater power than the Bai and Ng test in small samples.14 In applying the
Bai and Ng procedure to test for unit roots, we consider the common factors and the
idiosyncratic components separately. The number of common factors is determined
using the IC2 criterion developed by Bai and Ng (2002) and one common factor is
selected.15 Where there is only one common factor, Bai and Ng (2004) suggest using
a standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to test stationarity16:
13For more details see Bai and Kao (2006).
14See Appendix C for the results of the Monte Carlo simulations that conrm this. For further
details on the CIPS test and the ta and t

b statistics see Pesaran (2007) and Moon and Perron (2004)
respectively.
15One common factor is also selected when the other information criteria proposed by Bai and Ng
(2002) are considered.
16See Bai and Ng (2004, p.1133).
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F^t = c+ 0F^t 1 + 1Ft 1 +   + pF^t p + vt (9)
where Ft indicates an r  1 vector of common factors. The ADF tests results for the
extracted common factor provide evidence of a unit root in all the variables. To test
the stationarity of the idiosyncratic component, Bai and Ng (2004) propose pooling
individual ADF t-statistics with de-factored estimated components eit in the model
with no deterministic trend
e^i;t = di;0e^i;t 1 + di;1e^i;t 1 +   + de^i;t p + i;t: (10)
The pooled tests are based on Fisher-type statistics dened as in Maddala and Wu
(1999) and in Choi (2001). Let P ce^ (i) be the p-value of the ADF t-statistics for the
i-th cross-section unit, ADF ce^ (i), then the standardised Choi-type statistics is:
Zce^ =
 2Pni=1 logP ce^ (i)  2Np
4N
(11)
The previous statistic converges for (N; T !1) to a standard normal distribution.
In our analysis, we use the Fisher-type statistic dened as in Choi (2001). The pooled
p-value inverse normal tests do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all the
variables, providing strong evidence of nonstationarity. Similarly, the results obtained
with the tests developed by Pesaran (2007) and Moon and Perron (2004), which are
more powerful in small samples, show that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot
be rejected for all the variables.
Since the panel no cointegration hypothesis can be rejected only if the tests for
both the common factors and the idiosyncratic components reject the null of no coin-
tegration (see Gengenbach et al., 2006, pp. 698-99), we apply the panel cointegration
tests proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2004) to the defactored data and the Johansen (1988)
trace test to the common factor components. The results are reported in Table 3. For
the panel tests, we use two statistics proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2004). The rst sta-
tistic is a panel version of a non-parametric statistic that is analogous to the familiar
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Phillips and Perron rho-statistic, Z. The second is a parametric statistic which is
analogous to the familiar ADF t-statistic, Zt. These tests assume the null hypothesis
of no cointegration against the alternative that all units (countries) share a common
cointegrating vector. The results of these tests provide evidence of a common cointe-
grating vector for the whole panel. With regard to the common factor components,
a cointegrating relationship is found with the Johansen (1998) trace test in all the
models.
Having found evidence of cointegration in each of the models, we rst estimate these
models using the FMOLS estimator proposed by Pedroni (2004) under the assumption
of cross-sectional independence. Table 4 reports the estimation results. The term
proxying the marginal product of capital (b2) is always positive and strongly signicant,
as predicted by the theory. The coe¢ cient of the world interest rate (b3) is negative and
signicant in all the models, which is consistent with the interpretation that the world
interest rate captures an important component of the cost of capital, irrespective of the
extent to which the models incorporate nancial restraints. The coe¢ cients on the
various nancial restraints terms where they appear are positive but rarely signicant.
In Model FRA, which contains the unbundled nancial restraints term that is not
interacted with the dummy variable, b4 is positive and highly insignicant. In Model
FRD , where the unbundled term is interacted with the dummy aimed at capturing
the presence of nancial restraints, ~b4 is again positive and of a similar magnitude as
in Model FRA and remains highly insignicant. In Model FRA (unrestricted), which
unbundles the nancial restraints term, the real interest rate component b4, which
captures the real interest rate di¤erential is positive and insignicant. Interestingly, the
ination rate component b5 is positive and signicant at the 5% level. Its sign suggests
that a low domestic ination rate relative to the world ination rate has a positive e¤ect
on domestic investment (this e¤ect varies with the volume of domestic lending relative
to the capital stock). Conversely, when domestic ination exceeds world ination,
domestic investment decreases (this e¤ect also varies with the volume of loans relative
to the capital stock). This is broadly in line with the traditional McKinnon-Shaw
e¤ect which suggests that high ination has a negative e¤ect on investment because it
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depresses the supply of investable funds. However, the mechanism here is a di¤erent
one. The ination component of the nancial restraints term captures the part of the
low nominal interest rate that is due to low ination. If domestic ination is lower than
world ination, domestic nominal interest rates are low relative to the world capital
market and this reduces the cost of capital associated with domestic loans. Model
FR-ER, which includes the two exchange rate uncertainty variables, suggests that
both terms capturing exchange rate uncertainty are negative as expected, although
only one of the two - ~b5 - is signicant at the 5% level while the other one - b6 - is
insignicant. Thus, there is some evidence that exchange rate uncertainty depresses
domestic investment.
However, one may argue that the assumption of cross-sectional independence is
unrealistic in a world characterised by growing real and nancial inter-linkages. In
order to check for cross-sectional dependence in the estimates, we compute the long-
run cross-sectional correlation matrix of the residuals obtained for each model.17 The
results show that the correlations for model NC lie between 0.25 and 0.89, with an
overall average of 0.47, for model FRA between 0.23 and 0.90, with an overall average
of 0.46, for model FRD between 0.23 and 0.88, with an overall average of 0.48, for
model FRA (unrestricted) between 0.24 and 0.89, with an overall average of 0.53, and
for model FR   ER between 0.24 and 0.88, with an overall average of 0.51. Overall,
these results clearly show that the cross-sectional independence assumption is violated
for all the models.
Since evidence of cross-sectional dependence is found, we use the CUP-FM esti-
mator of Bai and Kao (2006), which allows for cross-sectional dependence through
common factors. Table 5 reports the estimation results. Allowing for cross-country ef-
fects impacts on both the magnitude and signicance of various coe¢ cients and alters
the economic interpretation of some of the results. The term proxying the marginal
product of capital (b2) is once again always positive and strongly signicant but its
coe¢ cient is much larger compared to the estimates obtained assuming cross-sectional
17Tables reporting cross-correlations are not provided here for brevity. These tables are available
upon request.
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independence. The coe¢ cient of the world interest rate (b3) remains negative and
signicant in all the models, but once again the estimated coe¢ cients are much larger
- hovering around  0:25 compared to  0:08 in Table 4 - suggesting that domestic
investment appears to be much more responsive to world capital markets if one allows
for cross-country e¤ects. Remarkably, all the nancial restraints terms remain positive
but are now statistically signicant at the 5% level, which now suggests that nancial
restraints do play an important role in determining investment. In Model FRA, the
unbundled nancial restraints term - b4 - is positive and signicant with a coe¢ cient
that has more or less the same size as the one on the world interest rate. The positive
coe¢ cient suggests that depressing the domestic interest rate through nancial re-
straints results in additional domestic investment, in contrast to the McKinnon-Shaw
prediction. In Model FRD , which interacts the nancial restraints term with the -
nancial restraints dummy, the coe¢ cient on nancial restraints (~b4) is more than twice
the size of the world interest rate coe¢ cient. This suggests that countries in which
nancial restraints were present are, in fact, the ones that may have beneted from
low domestic interest rates. Model FRA (unrestricted), which unbundles the interest
rate di¤erential into its two components does, however, provide some comfort to sup-
porters of the McKinonn-Shaw hypothesis in that it continues to show, as in Table
4, the positive e¤ects of low ination on investment. Nevertheless, the e¤ect of the
real interest rate di¤erential is now positive and signicant at the 5% level, suggesting
that depressing the real interest rate to below world levels has a positive e¤ect on
domestic investment. The positive e¤ect of low ination - or negative e¤ect of high
ination - suggests that to some extent McKinnon and Shaw are right to emphasise
the damage caused by high ination. However, in our case this is not so much be-
cause of the reduced supply of funds but rather because of the higher cost of capital,
since high ination - in the absence of interest rate ceilings that were common before
our sample period and were emphasised by McKinnon and Shaw - normally results in
higher nominal interest rates. On balance, as is shown in Model FRD , the aggregate
e¤ect of nancial restraints on domestic investment is positive, although the e¤ect of
the ination rate seems to be broadly along the lines suggested by McKinnon-Shaw.
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The results also suggest that exchange rate uncertainty is an even more important
determinant of investment if one takes into account cross-country e¤ects. Both terms
capturing exchange rate uncertainty (~b5 and b6) are now signicant at the 5% level and
their coe¢ cients are more than twice the absolute size compared to those reported in
Table 4.
4 Summary and Conclusion
This paper employs recently developed panel data methods to estimate a model of
private investment under nancial restraints for 20 developing countries using annual
data for 1972-2000. Unit root tests for cross-sectionally dependent panels show that the
variables are non-stationary. The application of panel cointegration methods reveals
a long run relationship among the variables. The nature of this relationship varies
depending on whether we take into account cross-country e¤ects. When we allow
for cross-sectional dependence, investment displays more sensitivity to world capital
market conditions and exchange rate uncertainty. A perhaps even more surprising
result is the nding that nancial restraints appear to have had a positive overall
e¤ect on domestic investment, in contrast to the McKinnon-Shaw prediction. On the
other hand, our ndings relating to the impact of ination on investment accord well
with the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis  regardless of whether allowance is made for
cross-sectional dependence. An applied econometrician who does not allow for cross-
sectional dependence when estimating investment equations across a panel of countries
may therefore nd more support for the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis than is warranted
by the data.
Our ndings, therefore, demonstrate the importance of cross-country e¤ects in es-
timating investment models. In addition, they suggest that countries that managed to
suppress domestic real interest rates without generating high ination enjoyed higher
levels of private investment than those that would have been obtained under liberalised
conditions. There is, of course, a limit to the extent that real interest rates can be
depressed by applying nominal interest rate ceilings without resorting to inationary
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policies. When low real interest rates are the result of high ination, private invest-
ment it seems does not appear to increase. Thus, while mild nancial repression can
stimulate private investment, severe repression through high ination may well have
the opposite e¤ect.
Our ndings highlight two new avenues for further research. Firstly, they suggest
that cross-country studies of private investment and possibly other macroeconomic
aggregates need to take into account cross-country e¤ects. Secondly, they suggest
that it may be fruitful to re-examine the e¤ects of nancial repression on other key
macroeconomic aggregates using the kind of techniques we have used in this paper.
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Appendix A: Description and Sources of Data
I is private xed capital formation; K is private capital stock; Y is real GDP; r is
US real lending rate; i is US nominal lending rate; r is domestic real lending rate; i is
domestic nominal lending rate; B is claims on private sector by deposit money banks
and other nancial institutions;  is the US ination rate (computed using the GDP
deator);  is the domestic ination rate (computed using the GDP deator); SDEX
is the 3-year moving average of the standard deviation of the domestic exchange rate
vis-à-vis the US dollar. The data is from the World Bank Development Indicators
(2008). Data on private investment is from Everhart S.S and M.A. Sumlinski (2001).
Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries, Statistics for 1970-2000 and
the Impact on Private Investment of Corruption and the Quality of Public Investment.
Discussion Paper No. 44, International Finance Corporation.
Appendix B: List of Countries
The panel comprises Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco,
Paraguay, Philippines, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Appendix C: Monte Carlo Simulation Results
Size and Size-Adjusted Power Comparisons of Panel Unit Root Tests
N = 20 Size Power
T = 30 CIPS ta tb BNADF cF^ BNZ
c
e^
CIPS ta tb BNADF cF^ BNZ
c
e^
0.047 0.051 0.039 0.038 0.045 0.520 0.922 0.789 0.130 0.270
Notes: The following DGP was considered: yit = i0 + z
0
it, zit = iz
0
it 1 +

PK
i=1 ijfit+
p
K"it. with (fit; "it; it)  i:i:dN(0; I3),  = 1, where the com-
mon factors and the idiosyncratic components are assumed to be of the same importance
(see Gutierrez, 2006), ij  U [ 1; 4], K = 1, i = 1; and i  [0:9; 1] for the size
and the size-adjusted power. The results were obtained using 1000 replications.
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Table 1: CD Tests Results
Statistics
Ijt
Kjt 1
4:696
(0:009)
Yjt
Kjt 1
7:865
(0:000)
(it ijt)
(1+it )(1+jt)
Bjt
Kjt 1
5:289
(0:000)
(rt rjt)
(1+it )(1+jt)
Bjt
Kjt 1
5:077
(0:006)
(t jt)
(1+it )(1+jt)
Bjt
Kjt 1
7:631
(0:000)
SDEXjt
Bjt
Kjt 1
3:657
(0:034)
SDEXjt 4:563
(0:011)
Notes: Pesaran (2004) shows that under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional
dependence CD
d! N(0; 1). p-values are in parenthesis.
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Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests Results
BNADF c
F^
BNZce^ CIPS t

a t

b
Ijt
Kjt 1
 2:153
(0:180)
 1:037
(0:717)
 1:512
(0:840)
 1:270
(0:102)
 0:107
(0:410)
Yjt
Kjt 1
 1:742
(0:410)
 1:910
(0:972)
 1:462
(0:851)
 0:291
(0:388)
 0:051
(0:490)
(it ijt)
(1+it )(1+jt)
Bjt
Kjt 1
 1:659
(0:402)
 1:244
(0:694)
 0:438
(0:956)
 1:145
(0:120)
 0:983
(0:176)
(rt rjt)
(1+it )(1+jt)
Bjt
Kjt 1
 2:070
(0:195)
 0:639
(0:906)
 2:001
(0:163)
 1:170
(0:112)
 1:042
(0:150)
(t jt)
(1+it )(1+jt)
Bjt
Kjt 1
 1:097
(0:510)
 0:708
(0:929)
 1:416
(0:867)
 0:789
(0:210)
 1:070
(0:131)
SDEXjt
Bjt
Kjt 1
 2:090
(0:210)
 0:972
(0:780)
 0:363
(0:978)
 0:923
(0:170)
 1:120
(0:134)
SDEXjt  1:071
(0:520)
 0:456
(0:885)
 1:988
(0:167)
 1:119
(0:125)
 1:242
(0:110)
Notes: Sample period 1972-2000. The number of common factors selected using the
IC2 criterion is equal to 1. The maximum number of factors is xed to 4. BNADF c
F^
and
BNZce^ denote the Bai and Ng (2004) unit root tests on common factor and idiosyncratic
component respectively. The ADF test regression only includes a constant. The number
of lags is selected using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The maximum number
of lags is xed to 4. CIPS denotes the panel unit root test proposed by Pesaran (2007).
The truncated version is applied as suggested by Pesaran (2007). The appropriate
lag-length for CIPS is selected using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) with a
maximum number of lags equal to 4. ta and t

b are the two statistics developed by Moon
and Perron (2004). p-values are in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Panel Cointegration Tests Results
Pedroni (1999, 2004) idiosyncratic cointegration
Models Z test Zt test
NC  18:055
(0:000)
 24:699
(0:000)
FRA  6:068
(0:000)
 2:775
(0:002)
FRD  6:254
(0:000)
 4:519
(0:000)
FRA(unrestricted)  3:691
(0:000)
 6:719
(0:000)
FR  ER  6:923
(0:000)
 7:215
(0:000)
Johansen (1988) factor cointegration
Models H0 : r = Trace Test
NC 0 23:029
(0:003)
1 3:841
(0:531)
FRA 0 31:482
(0:001)
1 0:220
(0:639)
FRD 0 24:395
(0:002)
1 0:343
(0:558)
FRA(unrestricted) 0 16:413
(0:036)
1 0:074
(0:785)
FR  ER 0 15:495
(0:048)
1 0:189
(0:663)
Notes: Sample period 1972-2000. The Pedroni tests include individual e¤ects. Z
and Zt denote the panel coe¢ cient  type and t-ratio tests. The number of cointegrating
vectors in the Johansen (1988) trace test is denoted by r and the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) lag length is 4. p-values are in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Panel Estimation Results with Cross-Sectional Independence
Pedroni FMOLS
NC FRA FRD FRA(unrestricted) FR  ER
b2 0:0014
y
(0:0004)
0:0028y
(0:0007)
0:0019y
(0:0006)
0:0021y
(0:0008)
0:0025y
(0:0007)
b3  0:0947
(0:0169)
y  0:0892y
(0:0202)
 0:0789y
(0:0190)
 0:0734
(0:0210)
y  0:0787y
(0:0215)
b4 - 0:1570
(0:2135)
- - 0:1480
(0:2319)
~b4 - - 0:1320
(0:2314)
- -
b4 - - - 0:1243
(0:1045)
-
b5 - - - 0:2123
(0:1071)
y -
~b5 - - - -  0:1529y
(0:0768)
b6 - - - -  0:1787
(0:1483)
b1 0:5083
y
(0:0923)
0:5183y
(0:1023)
0:4712y
(0:0893)
0:4892
(0:1153)
y 0:5032
(0:1093)
y
Notes: Sample period 1972-2000. The standard errors in parenthesis are computed
using a sieve bootstrap procedure (see Fachin, 2004; Chang et al., 2006).ydenotes sig-
nicance at the 5% level.
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Table 5: Panel Estimation Results with CrossSectional Dependence
Bai and Kao FMOLS
NC FRA FRD FRA(unrestricted) FR  ER
Two Stage
b2 0:0482
(0:0215)
y 0:0512
(0:0143)
y 0:0498y
(0:0141)
0:0503
(0:0145)
y 0:0494
(0:0141)
y
b3  0:2165y
(0:1024)
 0:2521y
(0:0831)
 0:2461
(0:0804)
y  0:2435
(0:0811)
y  0:2672y
(0:0762)
b4 - 0:2323y
(0:0754)
- - 0:2412y
(0:0761)
~b4 - - 0:5321
(0:1841)
y - -
b4 - - - 0:2127
(0:0639)
y -
b5 - - - 0:2699
(0:0923)
y -
~b5 - - - -  0:3131
(0:0982)
y
b6 - - - -  0:5017
(0:1218)
y
b1 0:7378
(0:1513)
y 0:7810y
(0:1934)
0:6951y
(0:1653)
0:7352
(0:2397)
y 0:7012
(0:2476)
y
Iterative
b2 0:0461
(0:1083)
y 0:0152
()
y 0:0489
(0:0139)
y 0:5021y
(0:0141)
0:0154
(3:71)
y
b3  0:2191y
(0:1023)
 0:2651
(0:0689)
y  0:2414
(0:0789)
y  0:2419
(0:0792)
y  0:2710y
(0:0796)
b4 - 0:2231
(0:0739)
y - - 0:2504
(0:0761)
y
~b4 - - 0:5215
(0:1823)
y - -
b4 - - - 0:2214
(0:0721)
y -
b5 - - - 0:2701
(0:0923)
y -
~b5 - - - -  0:3529y
(0:1123)
b6 - - - -  0:5271
(0:1391)
y
b1 0:7630
(0:1456)
y 0:7832
(0:1835)
y 0:6783
(0:1735)
y 0:7414y
(0:1998)
0:7234
(0:1956)
y
Notes: Sample period 1972-2000. The standard errors in parenthesis are computed
using a sieve bootstrap procedure (see Fachin, 2004; Chang et al., 2006). ydenotes
signicance at the 5% level.
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